Case 02: Friday night encryption
The capstone for SOC Operations. Case 01 walked you through an intrusion one question at a time. This one gives you what a real responder gets: a phone call, a pile of evidence and a list of things leadership needs to know. How you get there is up to you.
Everything here is made up. The organization, people, hosts and domains are fictional, the public addresses come from ranges reserved for documentation, and no file on this page is a program.
Level: you’ve finished Case 01, or the course up to lesson 11. Plan on four to six hours, in more than one sitting if you like. Tessera keeps your work in your browser between sittings.
The call
It is Saturday 31 October 2026, 08:30 UTC. You are the incident responder on call for Sanctorum Health, a group of five family clinics led by the Bleecker Street Clinic, with about 180 staff.
- 02:13 The EDR killed a process on FS-01, the file server, and on BKP-01, the backup server, for “ransomware behavior”, and isolated both. Nobody was watching: the SOC is staffed from 07:00 to midnight.
- 06:52 The Bleecker Street clinic’s front desk called the service desk. The practice-management app won’t load, and files on the billing share now end in
.sxstn. Every folder holds aREADME_RESTORE.txt. - 07:40 The clinics switched to paper. EHR-APP01, the practice-management server, is down and has been left powered on.
- 08:10 The IT manager declared a major incident. On counsel’s advice, the CEO has said: nobody contacts the attacker, and nothing gets restored until you say what’s safe.
The CEO wants answers by the afternoon: How did they get in? What did they take? Are they still in? What can we restore, and from when?
The environment
| Host | Role | Address | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| JUMP-01 | Remote desktop host for IT and remote billing staff | 10.0.5.10 | Reachable over RDP from the VPN |
| DC-01 | Domain controller | 10.0.2.10 | Its Security log is forwarded to the SIEM |
| FS-01 | File server: Billing, HR, Clinical-Scans, Forms shares |
10.0.2.20 | |
| EHR-APP01 | Practice-management (EHR and billing) app server | 10.0.3.15 | Excluded from the EDR pilot |
| BKP-01 | Backup server; copies off-site to a vault provider nightly at 01:00 | 10.0.2.30 |
- The domain is
SANC(sanc.example), and mail is@sanctorumhealth.example. - Staff connect to the VPN at
vpn.sanctorumhealth.example(192.0.2.10) and get an address in 10.8.0.0/24. The VPN asks for an MFA push, though a few accounts are exempt. adm.sstephensis S. Stephens’s admin account; S. Stephens is the IT lead.kwongis K. Wong in billing, who works from home on Thursdays and Fridays.- The EHR vendor’s support team connects to the VPN as
vendor.ehr.
The evidence
Everything was collected at 08:30 and its hashes are in the starter case file.
| Evidence | What it is | Open it in |
|---|---|---|
| vpn_auth.csv | VPN logins, failures and logouts, Thursday to Saturday | Recap |
| firewall.csv | Firewall connection log with bytes in and out | Recap |
| edr_alerts.csv | The EDR alert queue, with each alert’s status | Recap |
| jump-01_evtxecmd.csv | JUMP-01’s Security and Sysmon logs, parsed with EvtxECmd | Shifu |
| dc-01_evtxecmd.csv | DC-01’s Security log as the SIEM received it, plus System | Shifu |
| fs-01_evtxecmd.csv | FS-01’s Security, System and Sysmon logs | Shifu |
| bkp-01_evtxecmd.csv | BKP-01’s System and Sysmon logs | Shifu |
| History | Chrome’s history database for kwong on JUMP-01 |
Historian: download it, then drop it in |
| Payments_2026-10.csv.sxstn | An encrypted file from FS-01’s billing share | Hexes, side by side with the clean copy |
| Payments_2026-10.csv | The same file, from the off-site copy taken at 01:00 on Saturday | |
| README_RESTORE.txt | The ransom note | Your text editor, or Tessera’s Indicators section |
There is no image of EHR-APP01 and no copy of the encryptor. You have to work out what happened to them from the other hosts.
Your case notebook
The case file opens with what is known at 08:30: the two EDR kills, the service desk call, the decisions so far and every piece of evidence with its hash. Keep everything in it as you go. It is what you hand in.
What to deliver
Hand in two things: the Tessera case file (export it), and its report, with the sections below filled in. Write for two readers: the CEO reads the summary, and the next responder reads the rest.
- Executive summary. Half a page, no jargon. Answer the CEO’s four questions, say how sure you are of each answer, and give the decisions you need from leadership today.
- Timeline. From the first sign of the attacker to 08:30 Saturday, in UTC, with a source for every event.
- How they got in. The initial access, the weakness that made it possible, and how long the attacker had it before they used it.
- Scope. Every host and account the attacker touched, each with a status. Say which hosts were encrypted and how you know, including the one you have no logs for.
- What was taken. What left, when, how, to where and how much. Then set it against what the ransom note claims.
- The encrypted files. What the encryptor actually did to a file, and what that means for recovery.
- Recovery point. Which backups survived, which didn’t, and what is safe to restore. Explain why “the backup is from before the encryption” is not the same as “the backup is clean”.
- Containment and eradication. What to do now, in order, and why that order. Include every way the attacker could still get back in.
- Indicators. Every indicator, exported from Tessera and defanged.
- Detection gaps and lessons learned. Where the attacker could have been stopped and wasn’t. For each one, say what would have caught it, and who owns the fix.
Working the case
Work it however you like. If you want a route, this one follows the course:
- Recap first. Put the VPN, firewall and EDR logs on one clock. Look at the EDR alerts that came in before 02:13, and at what the SOC did with them.
- Then the edges. In the VPN log, look for the logins that don’t fit a user’s normal pattern. In the firewall log, look for hosts talking to places they never talk to, and for big byte counts.
- Then the hosts. Work JUMP-01’s logs in Shifu, then follow the accounts to DC-01, FS-01 and BKP-01. Shifu’s Send to → Recap puts what you find back on the timeline.
- Then the browser. In Historian, the attacker’s searches show what they were trying to do and what went wrong for them.
- Then the files. In Hexes, compare the encrypted file with the clean copy. Look at the entropy graph before you look at a single byte.
- Then the picture. Draw the attack path in Spoke, from your own edge list. Shifu’s Send to → Spoke builds one from a table.
- Last, the response. Run the ransomware scenario in Scrimmage and the Friday night encryption tabletop in Huddle. Then write your containment plan.
Stuck? Hints, one area at a time
- Initial access: the first time the attacker’s account worked was not Friday night. Filter the VPN log by source address.
- Privilege: check the logon on JUMP-01 at 21:06, and the event that follows it a few milliseconds later. Was
kwongmeant to be an administrator there? - Credentials: one EDR alert was closed as “blocked”. Did that stop the attacker? Look at what they ran in the next ten minutes, and at what they searched for in between.
- The admin account:
adm.sstephensnever logged in to the VPN on Friday. So where did the attacker get its password? Look for the last time it was used on JUMP-01. - Persistence: DC-01’s log has three events in under thirty seconds that change who is in charge of the domain.
- Exfiltration: add up
bytes_outfor JUMP-01’s connections on port 22. Shifu’s group-and-count step does the sum for you. - EHR-APP01: it has no logs here. Which host sent it the encryptor, and what does that host’s log show?
- Backups: put BKP-01’s events beside the firewall’s
backup-offsiterows. Which happened first on Saturday? - The encrypted file: what fraction of the file is high-entropy? What’s in the last few hundred bytes?
How it’s marked
If you’re taking the course on your own, mark yourself against this. If you’re teaching it, use it as written or adapt it.
| Area | Strong | Weak |
|---|---|---|
| Timeline (20%) | Complete from Thursday 02:11, every event has a source, and the times are UTC | Starts on Friday night, or mixes time zones |
| Initial access and scope (20%) | Finds the Thursday spray and the 43-hour wait, the exempt MFA group and the local-admin misconfiguration, and gives every host and account a status | Says “compromised VPN account” and stops there |
| Exfiltration (15%) | Gives the size, the destination, the tool, the shares and the time, and tests the ransom note’s claim against the firewall log | Repeats the note’s 210 GB, or says nothing left |
| Recovery (15%) | Finds the off-site copy that finished before the backups were deleted, and explains why it still isn’t clean | Says “restore from backup” |
| Containment (15%) | Puts the actions in the right order, removes every way back in, and says what each step costs | “Reimage everything and reset passwords” |
| Writing (15%) | A CEO can act on the summary; every claim cites evidence; it’s honest about uncertainty | Jargon, guesses stated as facts, no decisions asked for |
For instructors
The instructor’s answer key has the full timeline, the answers to the CEO’s four questions, the attack graph in Spoke, indicators, and notes on running the case as a graded assignment. It’s on a separate page so that students can’t stumble into it, but it is public: if you grade this, change something first, such as a time or a byte count.
The evidence is generated by cases/sanctorum/_build.py, which writes the same files every time. Change its seed or its story, run it, and you have a new version of the case.